VERTEX://
● LINKVERTEX://
● LINKLong-form analysis on counter-UAS economics, NDAA procurement, GPS-denied autonomy, loitering munitions, and the U.S. drone industrial base. Written for the procurement officer, the requirements writer, and the operator. Cited, not summarized.
A $20,000 Shahed-class drone absorbs a $4 million Patriot interceptor and still wins. The mass-attrition threat is an economics problem before it is an engineering problem.
Most "NDAA-compliant" drones do not in fact fully comply with the statute. A practical guide to §889, §848, §1260H, and what a contracting officer should verify before signing.
GPS is now contested on every battlefield that matters. How VIO + TRN replace GNSS, the sensor fusion architecture, and the drift performance to specify.
The U.S. OWA production gap is three orders of magnitude. Closing it requires getting a Group 1 loitering munition below $5,000 in volume — now an engineering problem with known answers.
The five first-tier suppliers that make a §848-compliant U.S. combat drone economically viable in 2026 — and the trade-offs each represents.
The Army's xTech Adaptive Strike Capability program, the NTC Fort Irwin demonstration profile, and what finalists are evaluated against in June 2026.